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Summary 
Conventional approaches to evidence in which RCTs are prioritised appear increasingly 
inadequate for the evaluation of complex mental health interventions.  By focusing on causal 
mechanisms and understanding the complex interactions between interventions, patients 
and contexts, realist approaches offer alternative ways of generating transferrable 
knowledge.  While it has been suggested that the two approaches might be combined in 
realist RCTs, substantial barriers remain. 
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Introduction 
Evidence-based policy and practice is firmly established in mental health care, bringing with 
it a need for evidence to be critically appraised.  The conventional biomedical view sees 
randomised controlled trials (RCTs) as the gold standard against which all other forms of 
evidence should be judged.  The suitability of RCTs for evaluating complex mental health 
interventions has long been questioned.  An alternative approach to evidence, realist 
evaluation (RE), has been developed and advocated across other policy areas.  Realism 
challenges the foundations on which scientific knowledge is created, and represents a 
paradigm shift.  We outline the advantages of RE for mental health research and explore 
what this might mean for the current hierarchy of evidence on which policy and 
commissioning decisions are based.  
 
Randomised Controlled Trials 
RCTs have played a vital role in the development of evidence-based mental health care.  
When applied in their ideal, or close to ideal form, their ability to control for confounding, 
reduce bias and elucidate the direction of causation, has enabled robust evaluation (and 
quantification) of the effectiveness of interventions.  Estimates of  ‘ŽǀĞƌĂůů ?, net effect sizes 
derived from trial results have allowed policy makers and commissioners to estimate the 
health economic consequences of delivering interventions to target populations.   
 
Work across a range of disciplines has suggested, however, that the strengths of RCTs may 
not be sufficient to warrant their inherent privileging as a gold standard.1  Many of the 
criteria ĨŽƌĂ ‘ǁĞůůĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚ ?Zdare often not achieved in practice due to attrition, lack of 
blinding and other biases post-randomisation.  Moreover, RCTs are intrinsically better suited 
to some areas and research questions than others.  Mental health care, other than that 
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limited to pharmaceutical interventions, is one area where RCTs  ‘fit ? less well.2  Psychological 
treatments rely on human agency (and specifically interpersonal interactions) and are 
therefore harder to manualise than drug treatments.3 Unlike pharmaceutical interventions, 
psychological and behavioural interventions typically change during treatment.  The skill of 
therapy, after all, lies in the ability to understand and meet ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?individual needs, and to 
respond to therapeutic progress or stasis. Complex mental health interventions, based on 
multiple interactive components and centred on interpersonal and informational activities, 
are problematic within an RCT paradigm.   
 
Recent moves towards personalised medicine represent a further challenge to the 
predominant position of RCTs.  Average treatment effects, even if estimated on the basis of 
well-conducted trials, apply to groups rather than individuals, and hence do not apply 
equally to everyone.  This is especially so when treatments are multifaceted and target 
individual human agency and interactions.  This also applies to social and other contexts: 
what works in one setting may not work in another. The social, economic and cultural 
contexts in which patients and complex interventions are embedded will, therefore, have 
effects at many levels.  And while data arising from RCTs may be used to test for sub-group 
effects (i.e. interactions between allocation group and factors such as patient characteristics 
or setting), these tests are limited in number and often lack statistical power.   
 
Realist evaluation 
There is a need for alternative approaches to the evaluation of complex mental health 
interventions. Crucially, approaches are needed that recognise, examine and evaluate 
variation, and sources of variation, in patient outcomes, with particular reference to the role 
of context.  
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Realist evaluation (RE) is one such approach. Arising from the work of scientific realists, most 
particularly Pawson and Tilley, the central formulation in RE concerns context, mechanism 
and outcome.4  Causation that generates outcomes is established through identifying 
mechanisms that may be activated or lie dormant, depending on context. Pawson and Tilley 
emphasise that interventions, in and of themselves, ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ‘ǁŽƌŬ ?but rest instead on the 
choices, intentions and behaviours of social actors as they engage with the mechanisms that 
interventions contain.  Thus, outcomes of interventions derive from the operation of specific 
mechanisms in particular contexts.  Using an often-quoted analogy from the physical world, 
sparks lead to gunpowder exploding but only under specific conditions (the presence of 
oxygen, a dry atmosphere etc.).  The mechanism is based on the chemical composition of 
gunpowder, while the conditions derive from the context.  The context-dependent operation 
of mechanisms leads in turn to the development of so-ĐĂůůĞĚ ‘CMO configurations ? - specific 
instances of Contexts and Mechanisms that are hypothesised to produce particular patterns 
of Outcomes.  
 
Realist evaluation and networks of evidence 
According to realist theory, evaluation cannot simply be concerned with estimating net 
effect sizes, i.e. in finding out whether a complex intervention works overall, or  ‘ŽŶĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ ?.
Instead, researchers should seek to establish what works, for whom, under what 
circumstances and why.  Crucially, it is careful thinking about and exploration of mechanisms 
- which pragmatic RCTs eschew - that allows researchers to uncover why interventions work 
and not simply what interventions work, overall, for populations of trial participants. 
 
Given this formulation, RE is concerned with building  ‘programme theories ? which aim to 
capture the mechanisms underlying complex interventions in the contexts in which they 
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work.  These theories are developed and refined through an iterative process centred on the 
findings of empirical research - networks of evidence - which may include, but does not 
prioritise, the results of RCTs.  In this way, RE does not favour any particular research design 
or methods of analysis.  Certainly, intensive (qualitative) methods have a role to play, 
especially those which move beyond simply recording the perceptions and views of those 
involved in interventions.  Equally, quantitative observational research can capture variation 
in outcomes that may be overlooked in trials that are concerned with evaluating overall 
effectiveness, and which are typically based on far smaller, and more homogenous (and 
hence less representative) samples than studies employing routine clinical datasets.  
 
A more open and diverse approach to evidence does ŶŽƚ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĂŶ ‘ĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐ
ŐŽĞƐ ?ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞŽƌĂƌĞůŝŶƋƵŝƐŚŝŶŐŽĨƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐǀĂůƵĞƐ ? Rather, as Pawson puts it, evaluating 
interventions in complex social worlds becomes the scientific task of  ‘ƐĐĂǀĞŶŐŝŶŐ ?ĂŵŽŶŐƐƚa 
range of evidence developed through a plurality of methods and subjecting each part of it to 
 ‘ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞĚƐĐĞƉƚŝĐŝƐŵ ?.5  Methodological guidelines, training resources and quality and 
reporting standards have been produced for this task by the NIHR-funded Realist And Meta-
narrative Evidence Syntheses: Evolving Standards (RAMESES) project. 6 
 
Can realist evaluation and RCTs ever co-exist? 
It has been suggested that adopting a realist perspective could lead to significant 
improvements in the way RCTs are conducted.  Triallists have also made their own advances 
with the basic parallel group design evolving to more advanced designs such as stepped 
wedge and patient preference designs, which are better suited to evaluating complex 
interventions. 
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Realism may bring additional gains to the conduct of RCTs. The emphasis on underlying 
casual mechanisms highlights the importance of elucidating theoriĞƐĂƌŽƵŶĚ ‘ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐŽĨ
ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƉƌŝŽƌƚŽƚŚĞĂĐƚƵĂůƌƵŶŶŝŶŐŽĨƚƌŝĂůƐ ?WĂƌĂĚŽǆŝĐĂůůǇ ?ǁŚŝůĞƚŚŝƐƚǇƉĞŽĨǁŽƌŬ-up is often 
conducted in relation to trials of specific clinical interventions (e.g. pharmaceutical and 
psychotherapeutic interventions), it is often missing from the development of more complex 
psychosocial interventions centred on mental health service delivery and patient behaviour. 
 
RE might also be seen as a means of improving parallel process evaluations of RCTs of 
complex interventions.  &ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ǇŶŐĂŶĚĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐ ?work on the Mental Health Link 
in London provided information that enabled the results of the accompanying RCT to be 
interpreted as well as providing key insights into the core functions of the intervention.7   
 
RE principles have also been used to shape the design and implementation of RCTs 
ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ?ůĞĂĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ƌĞĂůŝƐƚZdƐ ? ?8 While similar to realist-based 
ƋƵĂůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ‘ƌĞĂůŝƐƚZdƐ ?ĂůƐŽĐŽŶƐŝƐƚŽĨƋƵĂŶƚŝƚĂƚŝǀĞŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ
moderation analyses that aim to capture variations in intervention outcomes between 
contexts and subgroups.  Such analyses have shown how a Welsh intervention aimed at 
increasing physical activity worked for patients at risk of coronary heart disease but not for 
patients referred for mental health reasons.9   
 
This approach has, however, been roundly dismissed as antithetical to realism.10  According 
to realists, the fundamental characteristics and ambitions of RCTs means that they are 
wholly unsuitable to (and in principle designed to obviate rather than embrace) variability in 
the interactions between interventions, agents and contexts, seeking where possible to 
minimise the effects of all but the first of these, and thereafter to reduce the other two to 
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variables, to be measured.  On the other hand, realists, while framing programme theories 
as testable hypotheses, might be accused of avoiding refutation by insisting on the primacy 
of (further) theorising.  
 
While scientific psychiatry has always been proudly pragmatic and eclectic, the question we 
now face is whether these two epistemologies (positivism and realism) can ever be 
reconciled and harnessed in a common evaluative approach.  With some justification, 
proponents of realism object to this approach being subverted by the positivism and 
emphasis on outcomes simplified to average effects inherent in RCTs.  Realist evaluation, by 
contrast, is about understanding mechanisms of change based in infinitely complex (and 
changing) interactions between agents and contexts, and for many never the twain shall 
meet.   
 
Conclusion 
RCTs have significant limitations when it comes to evaluating complex and context-
dependent interventions, of the type which are common in mental health care.  By focusing 
on causal mechanisms and adopting a more pragmatic attitude to evidence, approaches 
based on realism offer potential for creating forms of evidence that are beyond the scope of 
positivist clinical trials.  Realist RCTs are not, it seems, for everyone and whether this 
approach is worth pursuing (and investing public research funds) will ultimately come down 
to a question of utility (and value of information) in the generation of evidence to inform 
policy and healthcare commissioning decisions.  
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